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DEFINING SPEECH IN AN
ENTERTAINMENT AGE: THE CASE OF




N Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, the Eighth
Circuit overturned an ordinance that restricted children's access to
violent video games.' As the court stated, "we are obliged to recog-
nize that [video games] 'are as much entitled to the protection of free
speech as the best of literature."' 2 However, this decision probably
doesn't mean the end of the video game controversy. Pending in Con-
gress is a bill that would criminalize the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors;3 and shortly after Interactive Digital was handed down,
a lawsuit was filed in a Seattle federal court seeking to overturn a Wash-
ington statute regulating violent video games.4
This spurt of regulatory interest in violent video games follows, in part,
from the belief that such games were a causal factor in various high
school shootings that have occurred in recent years. In addition to chal-
lenging various state regulations, the makers of video games have been in
court defending themselves against wrongful death lawsuits brought by
the families of children killed in those school shootings. At issue in those
cases was whether the violence in the video games had caused the vio-
lence later committed by the boys who had played those games. The
courts also had to address another issue-whether video games constitute
protected speech under the First Amendment. It is this issue that occu-
pies the focus of this article.
* Visiting Professor, University of South Dakota Law School; J.D. and Ph.D. in
Constitutional History, University of Minnesota. My gratitude to Candice Spurlin for her
assistance in the researching of this article.
1. 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 958.
3. Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act of 2003, H.R. 669,108th
Cong. (2003).
4. Ian Ith, Judge Blocks Law Restricting Sale of Violent Video Games, SEArrLE
TIMES, July 11, 2003, at B1. The Video Violence Law would impose a fine of up to $500 on
anyone who sells or rents to any minor any game that depicts violence against police of-
ficers. H.B. 1009, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2003). The lawsuit, Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Maleng, No. C03-1245L (W.D. Wash. filed June 5, 2003), seeks to have this law
declared unconstitutional.
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Recently the courts have reversed direction from their earlier decisions
in which video games were not seen as protected speech;5 and they have
made this reversal in a rather cursory manner. The judicial opinions have
rested more on mere presumptions than on any real examination of what
kind of speech the First Amendment aims to protect. These decisions
carry implications far beyond the entertainment realm of video games
because they set a precedence for how the courts will determine whether
new forms of technology constitute protected speech. They set the mold
for future cases that must deal with even newer technologies and even
more unexpected forms of entertainment. In the media society America
has become, the one sure thing is that there will continue to be new and
different technologies of entertainment. If every new technology is auto-
matically given First Amendment status, as seems to be the case with
video games, then there is a risk that the First Amendment may become
meaningless through an endless process of dilution.6
A half century ago, Alexander Meiklejohn published a series of influ-
ential writings in which he proposed a novel theory of free speech.7 Ac-
cording to Meiklejohn, the First Amendment protects only political
speech-the speech necessary for self-government. 8 When he first articu-
lated his theory, he was focusing on the dangers of censoring dissident
political speech during the Cold War. Meiklejohn saw political speech as
being at the core of the First Amendment, and yet it was political speech
that was being targeted.9 Even though such radical political speech is no
longer in the censorship crosshairs, Meiklejohn's theory may be more rel-
evant than ever. Indeed, the danger to political speech today may not be
from direct censorship, but from a kind of censorship-by-crowding-out.
With the rapid increase of media content, brought on by the explosion of
new communications technologies, political speech seems to be declining
in market share. Entertainment and advertising seem to be steadily push-
ing political speech aside, and the video game controversy illustrates this
problem.
Are video games to be given the same constitutional recognition as
political speech and thereby granted even more power and opportunity to
squeeze political speech further into the corners of the public's attention?
Rather than just automatically categorizing each new entertainment tech-
nology as protected speech, should not courts actually examine the issue
and come to some sort of modern definition of First Amendment speech?
If left alone, the mere onslaught of technology threatens to eventually
smother the more traditional forms of political speech. Is it not time,
5. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
6. See also JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
READER 100 (1996). "If we define [free speech] too broadly we will weaken the First
Amendment protection by spreading it too thin." Id.
7. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
8. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 107 (1960).
9. Id. at 107-13.
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during the Entertainment Age and a time of media abundance, that the
courts finally define the types of speech most deserving of First Amend-
ment protection?
II. THE CONCERNS GIVING RISE TO THE VIDEO
GAME CONTROVERSY
A series of school shootings provided the spark to a public backlash
against violent video games. In 1997, Michael Carneal opened fire on a
prayer group at his school, killed three girls, and wounded five people.10
On March 24, 1998, thirteen-year-old Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-
old Andrew Golden shot and killed four girls and a teacher while they
were evacuating school during a fire alarm. 1 Kip Kinkel went on a
shooting spree in his school's cafeteria on May 21, 1998, killing two stu-
dents and wounding twenty-two others. 12 Less than a year later, on April
20, 1999, in the worst school shooting in history, Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold killed twelve students and a teacher at Columbine High School,
befoie committing suicide themselves. 13
In the aftermath of these shootings, victims, commentators, and psy-
chologists alike blamed the graphic violence in video games that the
shooters were found to have frequently played. 14 The families of many of
the victims filed personal injury lawsuits against the publishers of various
video games. 15 These lawsuits relied on research that characterized vio-
lent video games as "firearms trainers" and "murder simulators. ' 16 Vari-
ous studies had painted video games as vehicles for "operant
conditioning" (in which players are rewarded for killing) and "stimulus
addiction" (whereby players come to crave the emotional response they
10. These killings led to a wrongful death action against video game manufacturers.
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
11. See Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801 (Ark. 2000).
12. See State v. Kinkel, 56 P.3d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
13. See Bill Dedman, Bullying, Tormenting Often Led to Revenge in Cases Studied,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, at 14.
14. Carneal liked to play Doom, Quake, Redneck Rampage, and Resident Evil-games
in which the player hunts down and shoots enemies. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d
683, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2002). Mitchell Johnson used to rent "Mortal Kombat," a brutal fight-
ing game. John Cloud, Of Arms and the Boy, TIME, July 6, 1998, at 58. Harris and Klebold
were described as "avid, fanatical and excessive consumers of violent . . .video games."
Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268 (D. Colo. 2002). But even
before the Columbine massacre occurred, senators concerned about children's exposure to
video game violence had introduced the Video Game Rating Act of 1994. Video Game
Rating Act of 1994, S. 1823, 103d Cong. (1994).
15. In James, the families of the murdered girls sued several video game publishers,
alleging that the games essentially caused Michael Carneal to go on his shooting spree. 90
F. Supp. 2d at 801. In 2001, relatives of the victims of the Columbine shootings filed suit
against many of the same video game companies named in the James suit, alleging that
video games had made violence pleasurable to Harris and Klebold and had trained them to
shoot and kill. Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
16. DAVE GROSSMAN & GLORIA DEGAETANO, STOP TEACHING OUR KIDS To KILL:
A CALL TO ACTION AGAINST TV, MOVIE & VIDEO GAME VIOLENCE 111 (1999).
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feel when engaging in virtual violence). 17 Some psychologists even
claimed that playing violent video games effectively desensitizes players
to killing and to death in general.18
Empirical studies looking at the effects of violent video games on chil-
dren have asserted that "a preference for violent games is correlated with
adjustment problems and negative self-perceptions in some groups of
children."' 19 The playing of video games "is positively related to aggres-
sive behavior and delinquency.12 0 Several experts suggest that this rela-
tion could be similar to the relation between tobacco use and cancer. Just
as not every smoker will develop cancer, neither will every video game
user behave more violently. However, a direct correlation exists, similar
to the connection of tobacco use with cancer, between the playing of vio-
lent video games and developing aggrcssive behavior.21
Although much of the research regarding violence in video games mir-
rors and builds upon the larger body of work regarding the effects of
television violence,22 there is evidence that the interactive nature of vio-
lent video games creates an even greater detrimental effect on the behav-
ior of those who play them than does the passive nature of television or
motion pictures.23 In a joint statement on the impact of video game vio-
lence on children, the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Acad-
emy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Psychological
Association, American Medical Association, American Academy of Fam-
ily Physicians, and American Psychiatric Association all declared that the
negative effects of interactive entertainment such as video games "may be
significantly more severe than that wrought by television, movies, or mu-
17. See Scott Whittier, School Shootings: Are Video Game Manufacturers Doomed to
Tort Liability?, 17 WHIrIER ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 11, 14-15 (2000); see also Richard C.
Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to Publishers of Violent or Sexu-
ally Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603, 604-07 (2000).
18. See Whittier, supra note 17, at 14-15. A fourteen-year-old video game player from
New York, who lists "Grand Theft Auto 3" as his favorite game, says: "'You could just go
home and play 'Grand Theft Auto' and come out refreshed .... If you're mad, you can
just play the game and run over people and kill people it's like an escape from reality."'
Kristina Nwazota, Video Games Facing a Ban, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 27, 2003, at N4. "One
of his favorite games, 'Matrix Reloaded,' ... allows players to shoot characters and watch
them die in slow motion." Id.
19. See Marketing Violence to Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transp., 106th Cong. app. A, at 4-5, 12 (1999) [hereinafter Marketing
Violence]; see also Scott A. Pyle, Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games? A Proposal for a
Violent Video Game Ordinance that Passes Constitutional Muster, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 429,
430 (2002).
20. Marketing Violence, supra note 19, at 12.
21. Id. at 2.
22. See, e.g., L. R. Huesmann et al., Longitudinal Relations Between Children's Expo-
sure to TV Violence and Their Aggressive and Violent Behavior in Young Adulthood: 1977-
1992, 39 DEV. PSYCH. 201 (2003). This 15-year study links children's viewing of violent TV
shows to later aggression as young adults, for both males and females. The findings apply
to children from any family, regardless of the child's initial aggression levels, their intellec-
tual capabilities, their social status as measured by their parents' education or occupation,
their parents' aggressiveness, or the mother's and father's parenting style.
23. See Craig A. Anderson, Ph.D., The Impact of Interactive Violence on Children,
2000 WL 11070122, at *3-5 (Mar. 21, 2000).
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sic."'24 The joint statement also asserts that in some children there is actu-
ally a causal connection between video violence and aggressive
behavior. 25 Or, as one psychologist put it, "[a]t the most, video games
cause children to disregard their natural aversion to killing while at the
very least they train children in the art of killing."' 26 Others have said that
such games "train video game players to shoot and kill in real life."'27
Besides showing the harmful behavioral effects of violent video games,
studies have demonstrated the ways in which those games are marketed
to children. With the average child playing ninety minutes of video
games each day,28 experts have estimated that children comprise up to
60% of the video game audience.29 A Federal Trade Commission study
released in December of 2001 showed that retailers allowed 78% of unac-
companied underage shoppers, including 66% of their thirteen-year-old
customers, to purchase M-rated games. 30 That same study revealed that
24% of children between ages eleven and sixteen included at least one M-
rated game when asked to state their three favorite video games.31 Other
studies have found that "over seventy percent of 'M' rated games are
marketed to children younger than age seventeen. '32
Not only are the games violent, but their advertisements, apparent to
anyone who walks down the video game aisle of a toy store, are filled
with violent messages. 33 Carmageddon claims it is "as easy as killing ba-
bies with axes." Point Blank asserts that "it is more fun than shooting
your neighbor's cat." Die by the Sword proclaims: "Escape. Dismember.
Massacre." Although these are obviously blatant examples, they are in-
dicative of the use of violence to attract buyers. One governmental study
found that 89% of the M-rated games and 96% of the T-rated games had
violence-related content descriptors.34
In response to the rash of school shootings and the subsequent public
outrage against violent video games, the City of Indianapolis, Indiana en-
24. AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE IMPACT OF ENTERTAIN-
MENT VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN, CONGRESSIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH SUMMIT 2 (July 26,
2000).
25. Id.
26. Kevin E. Barton, Game Over! Legal Response to Video Game Violence, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 133, 143 (2002).
27. Tara Campbell, Did Video Games Train the School Shooters to Kill?, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 811, 814 (2001).
28. See Marketing Violence, supra note 19, at 1.
29. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A
REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MU-
sic RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES app. D, at 5 (Sept. 2000) [hereinafter
FTC VIOLENCE RPT.].
30. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN 33
(Dec. 2001). M-rated games are suitable, according to the ratings, to persons ages 17 and
older.
31. Id. at 47.
32. Campbell, supra note 27, at 818.
33. See generally Marketing Violence, supra note 19 (testimony of Sen. Joe
Lieberman).
34. See FTC VIOLENCE RPrr., supra note 29, app. D, at 5. Games rated "Teen (T)"
have content suitable for persons ages 13 and older.
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acted an ordinance in July of 2000 that restricted minors' access to violent
video games in arcades and other public establishments. 35 This ordi-
nance, however, never went into effect because of a successful constitu-
tional challenge by the video game industry.36 A similar ordinance,
enacted by St. Louis County, was struck down in Interactive Digital
Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County.37 A third such statute is currently
being challenged in a federal court in Seattle. 38 Thus, it appears that no
matter how the courts rule on this issue, regulators will continue to target
certain video games.
III. VIDEO GAME CASE LAW
In Interactive Digital, the Eighth Circuit ruled unconstitutional an ordi-
nance prohibiting any person from providing graphically violent video
games to minors.39 The court overruled the lower court's finding that
video games were not a protected form of speech.40 Although the district
court had held that games needed to "express or inform" before they
were entitled to First Amendment protection,41 the Eighth Circuit ruled
that the First Amendment protects "'[e]ntertainment, as well as political
speech' . . . and that a 'particularized message' is not required for speech
to be constitutionally protected. '4 2 Noting that the First Amendment
was versatile enough to protect the paintings of Jackson Pollock and the
verse of Lewis Carroll, the court saw no reason why video games should
not be entitled to the same protection. It found that the violent video
games at issue contained "stories, imagery, [and] 'age-old themes of liter-
ature' . . . 'just as books and movies do." 43 The court also saw the inter-
activity of video games as similar to that of literature: "indeed, literature
is most successful when it 'draws the reader into the story, makes him
identify with the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with
them.'"44 Thus, the court concluded, "[w]hether we believe the advent of
violent video games adds anything of value to society is irrelevant; guided
by the first amendment, we are obliged to recognize that 'they are as
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature."' 45
35. Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance 72 (July 17, 2000).
36. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
37. 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2003).
38. See supra text accompanying note 4.
39. 329 F.3d at 954.
40. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1135
(E.D. Mo. 2002).
41. Id. at 1132. U.S. District Judge Stephen Limbaugh rejected plaintiffs' argument
that video games have sufficient expressive elements to trigger the First Amendment's pro-
tections: "It appears to the Court that either a 'medium' provides sufficient elements of
communication and expressiveness to fall within the scope of the First Amendment, or it
does not." Id. at 1134. After reviewing four games presented to the court-Resident Evil,
Mortal Kombat, DOOM, and Fear Effect-Judge Limbaugh concluded that the games con-
vey no "ideas, expression or anything else that could possibly amount to speech." Id.
42. Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 957.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 958.
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The Eighth Circuit placed great emphasis on its finding that video
games possess some kind of story line, as if this was the vital component
of protected speech. However, this was really the only element or charac-
teristic of speech mentioned by the court. Though it stated that protected
speech was not required to have a particularized message, the court speci-
fied no traits that would have to exist for the First Amendment to apply.
The court more or less assumed that video games constituted protected
speech. It brushed off any concerns about the kinds of images and graph-
ics in video games with the comment that "[t]he mere fact that they ap-
pear in a novel medium is of no legal consequence. '46 Yet it was almost
as if the novelty of the medium served as an automatic qualifier for First
Amendment protection, as if the mere newness of video games was
enough to warrant full constitutional coverage.
The opinion in Interactive Digital relied heavily on a case previously
decided by the Seventh Circuit. American Amusement Machine Ass'n v.
Kendrick involved a constitutional challenge to an Indianapolis ordinance
that sought to limit access of minors to violent video games. 47 In over-
turning the ordinance, and holding that video games qualified for full
First Amendment protection, the Seventh Circuit declined to carve out a
constitutional exception for violence, such as exists for obscenity.48 It re-
fused to treat violence like obscenity, insofar as it could be placed on the
list of expressive forms that can be regulated on the basis of their con-
tent.49 The reason obscenity was not protected speech was not because it
affected anyone's conduct (as was alleged in connection with violent
video games), but because it violated "community norms regarding the
permissible scope of depictions of sexual ... activity. ' 50 Thus, offensive-
ness, not harmfulness, was why obscenity lacked any constitutional pro-
tection. This distinction, the court said, undercut any attempt to carve
out a violence exception to protected speech, similar to that of
obscenity.51
Furthermore, the court added, violence was an historic element of cul-
tural expression. "Classic literature and art ... are saturated with graphic
scenes of violence, whether narrated or pictorial," the court said,52 liken-
ing violent video games to the portrayals of violence in The Odyssey
("with its graphic descriptions of Odysseus's grinding out the eye of Poly-
phemus"), The Divine Comedy ("with its graphic descriptions of the tor-
tures of the damned"), War and Peace ("with its graphic descriptions of
execution by firing squad"), and the stories of Edgar Allen Poe. 53 Vio-
46. Id. at 957.
47. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 574 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 575. "But offensiveness is not the basis on which Indianapolis seeks to regu-
late violent video games." Id. The basis of the ordinance, instead, was a belief that violent
video games led to violent behavior. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 577.
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lence, according to the court, has always been a central interest of hu-
mankind and a recurrent theme of culture; therefore, violent video games
are just doing what countless authors have done before. Going even fur-
ther, the court indicated that such games may be a key component of
individual development. According to the court, "[p]eople are unlikely
to become well-functioning, independent-minded adults and responsible
citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble. '54 The court asserted
that exposure to violent images is something that minors should not be
shielded from until they turn eighteen, since it "would not only be quix-
otic, but deforming" to leave a minor unequipped to cope with the harsh
reality of a culture in which violence has become a permanent fixture. 55
Thus, in the court's view, video games are a necessary tool in the nurtur-
ing of future citizens and voters, so that young "minds are not a blank
when they first exercise the [vote]." '56
This viewpoint contrasts sharply with that of the D.C. Circuit toward
indecent television programming. In a ruling upholding an FCC regula-
tion confining indecent broadcast programming to the hours between 10
p.m. and 6 a.m., the court likewise recognized that "[a] democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens."'57 Contrary to Kendrick, the
court took a completely different approach to aid the development of
society's children. It upheld legislation shielding children from what was
seen to be harmful speech. 58 Furthermore, the court ruled, "a scientific
demonstration of psychological harm is [not] required in order to estab-
lish the constitutionality of measures protecting minors from exposure to
indecent speech."'59 "Congress does not need the testimony of psychia-
trists and social scientists in order to take note of the coarsening of im-
pressionable minds that can result from a persistent exposure to sexually
explicit material. '60 These same arguments, obviously, could be used in
54. Id.; see also David C. Kiernan, Shall the Sins of the Son Be Visited upon the Father?
Video Game Manufacturer Liability for Violent Video Games, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 207, 219
(2000) (arguing that "not recognizing video games as a form of protected entertainment
deprives citizens access to aesthetic, political, social, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences that are or may be intertwined with the video game").
In addition, freedom of expression is essential to the promotion of self-fulfill-
ment and autonomy by protecting and encouraging the exercise of the crea-
tive capacities "central to human rationality." Thus, protecting video games
fosters and protects the personal autonomy and self-fulfillment interest of
the video game designers who painstakingly exercise their creative capacities
in developing storylines, plots, characters, and rich animation.
Kiernan, supra, at 219.
55. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577-78.
56. Id. at 577.
57. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
58. Id. ("[I]t is [in] the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that chil-
dren be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and
independent well-developed ... citizens." (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
165 (1944))).
59. Id. at 661-62.
60. Id. at 662-63 (adding that the "Supreme Court has reminded us that society has an
interest not only in the health of its youth, but also in its quality").
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support of regulations limiting minors' access to violent video games.
As with the opinion in Interactive Digital, the Kendrick decision made
numerous presumptions about the speech qualities of video games. In
one paragraph, the court equated video games with the greatest works of
literature in human history.61 Moreover, the court decided that the inter-
activity of video games, instead of setting them apart from literature, ac-
tually made them more akin to literature.62 After all, the court noted, it
was "[p]rotests from readers [that] caused Dickens to revise Great Expec-
tations to give it a happy ending;" and as further evidence of the interac-
tivity of literature, the court stated that "tourists visit sites in Dublin
[where] the fictitious events of Ulysses are imagined to have occurred. '63
One thing certainly has to be said about the Kendrick court: it was defi-
nitely getting into the fantasy of fiction when it equated tourists rummag-
ing around neighborhoods in Dublin with young children competing with
each other as to how many heads and arms and legs they can blow off
with their arsenal of virtual weaponry.
Up until Kendrick, no court had explicitly held that video games consti-
tuted speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. Nor has the
Supreme Court ever dealt squarely with this issue.6 4 But in addition to
Interactive Digital, several other courts have subsequently adopted the
Kendrick view on video games. In James v. Meow Media, Inc., parents of
children killed during a school shooting in Kentucky sued the makers and
distributors of violent video games that the shooter had frequently
played.65 But the court, following the lead of Kendrick, ruled that video
games were constitutionally protected speech. Just as the Kendrick court
had done, the James court refused to extend the obscenity exception be-
yond material of a sexual nature. 66 It did not even consider carving out
any other exceptions to protected speech. Even though video games are
a relatively new medium, and even though they contain violence of a
uniquely graphic nature, the court declined to examine whether such vio-
lence should be treated as obscenity-e.g., as speech outside the scope of
the First Amendment.
In the current media environment, with the explosion of graphics fan-
tasy and imagery and simulated reality, it may make sense to take a fresh
look at what kinds of 'entertainment' should receive constitutional pro-
tection and which should be given a lesser degree of constitutional status.
It may be time to consider whether the narrow pigeonhole exception of
61. This comparison is repeated in Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., a wrongful
death action brought against video game makers by the survivors of a teacher killed by two
students. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (D. Colo. 2002).
62. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
63. Id.
64. The Court has only remotely faced a video game ordinance once, and on that occa-
sion, the issue was of due process and not the arcade owners' First Amendment right. City
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 286 (1982).
65. 300 F. Supp. 3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
66. Id. at 697.
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obscenity should be modified to include other things like video game vio-
lence aimed at children.
Courts have asserted that "there is no 'precise test for determining how
the First Amendment protects a given form of expression.' 67 Moreover,
"[e]ach medium of expression ... must be assessed for First Amendment
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems. ' 68 These statements seem to reflect precisely what the First
Amendment requires: for courts to closely scrutinize the nature of new
media before granting constitutional protection. Instead, the courts are
following Kendrick, holding that video games are protected speech and
stating that any medium that either "convey[s] information or evoke[s]
emotions by imagery are protected under the First Amendment. '69
The Supreme Court has granted First Amendment protection to en-
tertainment, as well as political speech. 70 This includes motion pictures,71
live entertainment, 72 music, 73 and even non-verbal entertainment such as
live nude dancing.74 Yet despite this abundance of case law, the Court
has not articulated constitutional standards that courts can use to ascer-
tain when certain acts or imagery fall within the protected category of
entertainment. 75 Consequently, there is "no type of blanket protection
afforded to all of the different entertainment genres."' 76 Each form of
entertainment must be judged on its own particular form and content.77
Following this rule, courts prior to Kendrick and Interactive Digital re-
garded video games as falling into a "gray area" of speech that may have
some First Amendment protection but is nevertheless an "outer ambit"
of speech, allowing the government greater freedom to regulate. 78
67. See Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179 (D. Conn. 2002) (in-
volving a personal injury claim against the video game industry and quoting Am. Amuse-
ment Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 952 (S.D. Ind. 2000)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 181. Yet despite the assertion that any medium that conveys information or
evokes emotions by imagery qualifies for full First Amendment protections, not all forms
of media do receive such protections. The broadcast media, for instance, occupies a lower
constitutional status than does the print medium; and the content of broadcast speech can
be more easily regulated than can the content of newspapers. See FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
70. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
71. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
72. Schad, 452 U.S. at 61.
73. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
74. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
75. See Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 472 A.2d 809, 810 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983) (stating that the Supreme Court has not articulated any precise test for determining
the level of protection afforded to entertainment, and, in particular, video games).
76. Pyle, supra note 19, at 461.
77. See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
78. See, e.g., Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J., concurring). In his opinion in Miller, Judge Posner stated:
There are some clearly expressive activities and some clearly nonexpressive
ones but there is also a vast gray area populated by ... creators of video
games .... and so on without end. The government has a greater scope for
regulation in the gray area. Maybe, indeed, that area could be regarded as
outside the boundaries of the First Amendment.
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A. THE EARLY STAGE OF VIDEO GAME CASES
The first video game cases were fairly uniform in their denial of First
Amendment protections. In America's Best Family Showplace v. City of
New York, the court likened video games to mechanical entertainment
devices, such as pinball machines, and recreational pastimes, such as
chess and baseball, consisting of rules and implements:
In no sense can it be said that video games are meant to inform....
That some of these games 'talk' to the participant, play music, or
have written instructions does not provide the missing element of
'information' . . . . [T]hey 'contain so little in the way of particular-
ized form of expression' that video games cannot be fairly character-
ized as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. 79
For speech to fall within the protected entertainment category, the court
required that it contain a communicative or informative element. 80
Subsequent to the America's Best decision, other courts followed suit
and held that video games could not receive constitutional protection be-
cause they were not designed to communicate or express information. 81
In Caswell, for instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that any
communication of information disseminated while playing a video game
is inconsequential. 82 But near the turn of the millennium, and in direct
contrast with the America's Best line of cases, courts began to concede
First Amendment protection to video games.
B. A CRITICISM OF THE RECENT TREND IN VIDEO GAME CASES
The trial court in Kendrick upheld the Indianapolis ordinance restrict-
ing children's access to violent video games, asserting that there was no
principled constitutional difference between sexually explicit material
(which may be regulated) and graphic violence (at issue with video
games), at least as they pertained to children. 83 On appeal, however, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court and held that obscenity occupied
a unique niche within First Amendment jurisprudence and that violence
did not fit into this niche.84 What the court did not consider was whether
a particular form of violence (video game violence) should be given its
Id.
79. 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669
F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982)).
80. Id. at 173.
81. See Malden Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.
Mass. 1983); Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 472 A.2d 809, 812 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983); Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 926-27 (Mass. 1983);
Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 609 (Mass. 1983);
People v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); City of St. Louis v. Kiely,
652 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Af-
fairs, 459 N.Y.S.2d 220, 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
82. Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 927.
83. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 971 (S.D. Ind.
2000), rev'd and remanded, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
84. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2001).
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own category of First Amendment exclusion, whether obscenity should
be given a more expansive reading beyond mere offensiveness, or
whether in a media society of ever increasing technological imagery more
care should be given as to what imagery receives constitutional protec-
tion. After all, under the First Amendment the issue of whether some-
thing qualifies as protected speech is a more open question than whether
particular restrictions on protected speech are allowed to stand. Conse-
quently, judges should take a more objective stance toward examining the
constitutional worthiness of new forms of media. 85
If courts are asked to treat violent speech similarly to obscene speech,
they should look at all the reasons underlying the obscenity exception to
the First Amendment. Contrary to the court's reasoning in Kendrick, the
rationale for obscenity laws goes beyond simply the offensive nature of
the material. In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, for instance, the Supreme
Court suggested that a connection between antisocial behavior and ob-
scene material could also justify legislative regulation of obscenity.86
It has been thirty years since the Court last created an exception to
protected speech under the First Amendment. The obscenity exception
basically began with Miller v. California, where the Court defined obscen-
ity as "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value." 87 With the media and technological developments of the past
three decades, however, perhaps a violence exception is now warranted.
The Kendrick approach also erodes the integrity of the constitutional
model governing the broadcast medium.88 If broadcast content can be
regulated based on the fact that the broadcast medium has the capacity to
be intrusive and harmful to children in ways that the print media is not,
then other new media should be similarly treated if found to have that
harmful or manipulative characteristic. However, when the courts auto-
matically elevate violent video games in a First Amendment sense, above
broadcast medium, the entire rationale underlying broadcast regulation is
cast into doubt.
85. What I propose has been termed a "defining in" approach, which "would identify a
category of covered speech based upon 'the underlying theory of the First Amendment and
would exclude everything else."' Cynthia L. Estland, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 (1990).
But as one commentator has put it, modern First Amendment doctrine "follows the 'defin-
ing-out' approach: 'speech' is presumptively within the realm of the First Amendment un-
less it is shown to be excluded." Id.
86. 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973). Thus, the policy behind the obscenity exception is not just
limited to the offensive nature of obscene speech.
87. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
88. See supra note 69. This model gives broadcast a lower First Amendment status
than is given to the print media. Consequently, on a content basis, broadcast speech can be
regulated in ways that print speech cannot. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978). One of the rationales given for this lower constitutional status is that the broadcast
medium can be more intrusive and hence, more harmful to children.
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Another criticism of the Kendrick opinion involves its view of video
games as a type of speech vital to human development. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in comparing the restrictions on video games with Nazi Germany's
denial of free speech to children, states that violence has always been a
part of society and that children should not be shielded from it, lest they
be left "unequipped to cope with the world as we know it."89 The court
also compared the violence in video games with the violence portrayed in
some of the great works of literature; 90 but to say that the descriptions of
violence in The Odyssey, The Divine Comedy, and War and Peace are
similar to the violent imagery in video games is to stretch reality to the
breaking point. Despite the court's characterization of literature as an
interactive medium, a book is nowhere near as interactive as a video
game. No book seeks to make violence as addicting and all-consuming as
video games do. Furthermore, modern video games are capable of por-
traying violence in a graphic, thrilling, and even appealing way that books
cannot come close to replicating. 91 The modern games are "alarmingly
true to life and include splattering blood whenever someone is shot or
chain sawed." '92
If the Kendrick court is correct in its view that children need to be
exposed to violence through some media form if they are to grow into
healthy adults, then would it not be wiser to steer this exposure toward
the medium of books and newspapers? Is not the print medium a place
where individuals get a more informed, broad-based, and less sensational-
ized education on a subject such as social violence? Is not the print me-
dium a preferred medium for that kind of educational and developmental
purpose? Shouldn't courts, in a media society such as America has be-
come, look to the totality of the speech available to the public? For in-
stance, the occurrence and concept of violence is pervasively expressed
through every medium in society. Thus, is it really an unconstitutional
abridgement of an idea or image to limit its expression or conveyance in
just one of the media outlets operating in a media-abundant society?
Prior to the explosion of communications technologies, the censorship
of a particular medium (or of a particular way of conveying an idea or
information) amounted more or less to a complete censorship of that idea
or information. But now, courts should expand their vision when ad-
dressing the restrictions placed on one kind of output or imagery of one
kind of media. Courts should look at the whole of the media society to
see if a restriction on one form of media is really an unconstitutional in-
fringement on speech. In a media society bulging with unlimited media
content, courts should approach censorship issues as they do issues of
statutory construction or interpretation-they should look at the whole
89. 244 F.3d at 577.
90. Id.
91. William Li, Unbaking the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional Implicatins of Im-
posing Tort Liability on Publishers of Violent Video Games, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 476
(2003).
92. Campbell, supra note 27, at 816.
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scheme. They should examine whether the particular restriction amounts
to an effective censorship of an idea or piece of information in the society
at large.93
The video game industry argues that unless it receives full constitu-
tional protection, it may have to "sanitize" its games. 94 But even if such
"sanitization" occurs, will an idea or opinion be smothered? Is somehow
the spirit of the First Amendment violated if video games have a little less
blood and gore and mayhem? Is graphic, sensationalized violence that
essential to any useful idea? Are sophisticated, intelligent games not pos-
sible without blood-curdling violence? If video games cannot survive
without the use of such manipulative violence, what does that say about
video games or about the direction of our society?
IV. THE JUDICIAL DUTY TO DEFINE PROTECTED SPEECH
As technology advances, more communication media will be devel-
oped; and as America, the world leader in media, increasingly specializes
its economy toward its strengths, there will be many different kinds of
technological imagery, graphics, and entertainment available. Therefore,
it will become necessary for the courts to determine, amidst this flood of
technology, precisely what forms of entertainment qualify as protected
speech under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has noted that a "medium of expression" should
be judged by standards uniquely suited to it, because "each [medium]
may present its own problems. ' 95 Thus, even though the Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the applicability of the First Amendment to video
games, it has nonetheless directed lower courts to study each medium
before making any such application. In the past, the Supreme Court has
carved out several exceptions to First Amendment protection: fighting
words, 96 obscenity,97 child pornography, 98 defamation, 99 clear and pre-
sent dangers, 10 0 and speech intended to incite imminent unlawful activ-
ity.10 1 Therefore, there is certainly nothing preventing the courts from
93. Courts can distinguish between laws that suppress ideas and laws that only sup-
press particular expressions of those ideas. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971)
(stating that the First Amendment has "never been thought to give absolute protection to
every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address
in any circumstances that he chooses"). For instance, many books and movies express
violence-so do we really need a video game expression of the same thing (and in a way
that has a particularly harmful effect on children)?
94. Li, supra note 91, at 494.
95. Southeastern Prods., Inc. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
96. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
97. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
98. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
99. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
100. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
101. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). All the above categories of speech
are often referred to as low-value speech. Although the government cannot suppress low-
value speech arbitrarily, courts normally uphold restrictions as long as the government can
show a rational basis for its actions. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 195 (1983) (noting that "[t]he conclusion
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carving out further exceptions as new media or new forms of entertain-
ment may warrant.
Not only are there judicially-created exceptions to speech covered by
the First Amendment, but there is also a hierarchy of speech within the
First Amendment. Different types of speech receive varying levels of
First Amendment protection.10 2 Noncommercial speech, for instance, is
"consistently accorded.., a greater degree of protection than commercial
speech.' 10 3 A priority scheme even exists with respect to nonobscene,
sexually-explicit speech.10 4 "[T]he First Amendment offers such speech
protection 'of a wholly different and lesser magnitude." 0 5 Courts have
found "a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is
on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in
the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance."' 1 6 For
instance, in approving a school district's sanctioning of a student speech
containing sexual innuendo and profane language, the Supreme Court
drew a clear distinction between such speech and a more serious message
of political protest, which would be protected. 10
7
First Amendment jurisprudence has created somewhat of a hierarchy
in the constitutional protection of speech: "[c]ore political speech occu-
pies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and nonob-
scene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class
expression; [and] obscenity and fighting words receive the least protec-
tion of all."' 01 8 Speech that forms "no essential part of any exposition of
that a particular class of speech has only low first amendment value does not mean that the
speech is wholly without constitutional protection or that the government may suppress it
at will").
102. See Ausness, supra note 17, at 638.
103. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1132
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that "[w]hile commercial speech is afforded First Amendment
protection, noncommercial speech is higher up on the hierarchy of protected speech"),
vacated by 340 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043,
1055 (3d Cir. 1994); Arlington County Republican Com. v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587,
593 (4th Cir. 1993); Commodity Trend Serv. v. Commodity Futures Trading, 233 F.3d 981,
993 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[c]ommensurate with its subordinate position within the
First Amendment hierarchy, advertising receives less protection ... than fully protected
speech"). "Commercial speech occupies a position somewhere between fully-protected
speech and 'low value' speech in the First Amendment hierarchy." Ausness, supra note 17,
at 639.
104. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (stating that "it is
manifest that society's interest in protecting [erotic materials] is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate ... few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified
Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice").
105. Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Nichols, 137 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
106. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 61); see also Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San
Antonio, 310 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2002) (sexually-oriented expression falls into "a cate-
gory of speech subject to less than full First Amendment protection" (quoting SDJ, Inc. v.
City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1988))).
107. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
108. Cannabis Action Network v. City of Gainesville, 231 F.3d 761, 775 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality" falls low on the First Amendment ladder. 0 9
There exists "practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the
First] Amendment [is] to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs." 110
In addition to this hierarchy within the First Amendment, certain
speech can be treated differently when being exposed to children."'
Given the compelling interest in the upbringing of children, the govern-
ment can sometimes enact laws that shield children from material that is
otherwise protected.1 1 2 The Court has recognized three justifications for
treating the constitutional rights of children differently from those of
adults: the "vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child-rearing."1 1 3 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court stated that
some types of speech available to adults are "wholly inappropriate for
children" of "tender years."'1 4 In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court up-
held a state regulation aimed at suppressing only children's access to in-
decent speech, while leaving adult access unfettered.1 1 5 The Court ruled
that it was permissible "to accord minors under 17 a more restricted right
than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what
sex material they may read or see." 116 This legal dichotomy of allowing
adult access to materials, while prohibiting access to minors, did not vio-
late a minor's First Amendment rights. 117
To assess whether a particular act or imagery is protected by the First
Amendment, a court must first determine if the act or imagery amounts
to speech. Once that issue is decided, the court must then address
whether the expression falls within (or outside) the ambit of protected
109. United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phil., 898 F.2d 914, 929 (3d
Cir. 1990) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)); see also
Zapach v. Dismuke, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Speech on public issues and
political matters lies at the heart of protected speech." (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966))).
110. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 218); see
also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984) ("[E]xpression on public
issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values"'
(quoting NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)); Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (stating that "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government").
111. See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting
Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 436-46 (2000).
112. Id.
113. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
114. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 115 (2001) (noting that children of tender years are children whose experience in the
real-world is limited and their beliefs "are the function of environment as much as of free
and voluntary choice," (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985))).
115. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
116. Id. at 637.
117. Id.
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speech. For instance, even if video games are to be considered a form of
expression, the decision must then be made whether that particular ex-
pression is core speech protected by the First Amendment, or whether it
is merely low-value speech. One of the ways of determining whether cer-
tain speech is low-value is whether it serves the essential purposes of the
First Amendment.
V. DEFINING FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH
A. THE JUDICIAL FAILURE TO MAKE THE EFFORT
In Watters v. TSR, Inc., a mother brought a wrongful death action
against the maker of the Dungeons and Dragons video game, alleging
that the game had caused her son to commit suicide.1 8 The court held
that regardless of whether Dungeons and Dragons was characterized as
literature or merely a game, it nonetheless fell within the category of pro-
tected speech;" 9 however, no analysis was provided as to why the game
constituted protected speech. This stance was similar to the one later
taken in the Kendrick and James cases, where the courts adopted an "ab-
solutist" position that all video games, even if designed solely to enter-
tain, "are not only a protected form of expression but are entitled to the
same level of protection as political speech. 1 20
Such automatic presumption of constitutional status mirrors the way
the courts have approached other kinds of free speech cases. For in-
stance, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized
that the language of several previous cases had established that nude
dancing constituted protected expression. 121 Although stating that public
nudity was not protected, 122 the Court provided no real guidelines as to
why nude dancing was protected speech, nor did it provide guidance as to
the constitutional distinction between nude dancing and public nudity.123
The Court made no attempt to define what kind of speech the First
Amendment was meant to protect; instead, it simply made the same pre-
sumption of constitutional coverage that would later be made in the vio-
lent video game cases.1 24
With respect to determining what speech is to be protected under the
First Amendment, courts have found an "elusive line between entertain-
ing and informing. 1 25 Instead of trying to address or determine this elu-
sive line, however, the courts have simply fallen back upon a presumption
of protected speech. They have not articulated a coherent theory or any
118. 715 F. Supp. 819, 820 (W.D. Ky. 1989), affd on other grounds, 904 F.2d 378 (6th
Cir. 1990).
119. Id. at 821.
120. See Kiernan, supra note 54, at 215.
121. 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).
122. Id. at 571.
123. But does that mean that essentially anything done up on a stage is protected
speech?
124. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
125. See Kiernan, supra note 54, at 217.
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set of factors that might ever justify not extending constitutional protec-
tion. 26 Consequently, we have been left with the rule that practically any
form of entertainment will be viewed as protected speech.
This approach, however, poses problems when viewed within the larger
context of the media society that America has become. Contrary to the
situation even twenty or thirty years ago, the advances in communication
technologies have brought on an explosion of different kinds and forms
of entertainment. If the courts cannot somehow carve out of this dense
forest of entertainment a clearing of First Amendment speech, then the
First Amendment itself will increasingly lose meaning, not amidst censor-
ship, but amidst a suffocating blanket of media chatter.
The line of recent video game cases reveals a direction in free speech
jurisprudence that may very well be at odds with the purposes of the First
Amendment. The decisions seem to rest constitutional protection on the
artistic creativity embodied in the software, rather than upon any commu-
nication of ideas. But if artistic creativity is the essential component of
protected speech, then should not the color schemes and furniture ar-
rangements of interior designers qualify for First Amendment
protections?
The video game cases also seem to rely on the realism that the games
are able to convey. Sophisticated games today use "full-motion video,
detailed animation, and stereo surround sound" to bring their action to
life.' 27 They are able "to simulate real-world environments" in games
like Postal, Doom, and Mortal Kombat.128 However, if simulating reality
is a component of First Amendment coverage, then shouldn't the sets and
targets in a realistic shooting range qualify for constitutional protection?
B. THE MEIKLEJOHN APPROACH TO DEFINING PROTECTED SPEECH
Most First Amendment textbooks contain a section discussing the pur-
poses and values of free speech. There is the truth value, the self-fulfill-
ment value, the safety-valve value, and the democratic self-governance
value. 129 This latter value is often associated with, or illustrated by, the
writings of Alexander Meiklejohn. 130 To Meiklejohn, the First Amend-
ment does not forbid the abridging of speech, but only the abridgement of
freedom of speech 131-a freedom that applies only to the political speech
necessary for the conduct of self-government. Meiklejohn also sees a dis-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 218.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998-1005 (4th ed. 2001).
130. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8. "In modern times, the prominent place
of 'democratic self-governance' as a rationale for protecting freedom of speech is due in no
small measure to the prodigious scholarly efforts of Alexander Meiklejohn who, in a series
of important works, articulated the view that freedom of speech is necessary to intelligent
self-governance in a democracy." 1 RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH 27 (2003).
131. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 130, at 19 (emphasis added).
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tinction between public speech and private speech.1 32 The First Amend-
ment covers only speech that is related to self-governance because only
that kind of speech is truly part of the public arena.133 By contrast,
speech that is pursued merely for private purposes or gain amounts to a
mere individual good.
Meiklejohn argues that since "self-governance is the whole point" of
the American constitutional scheme, then "freedom of speech must be
defined in 'relation to self-governance." 134 Essentially, for Meiklejohn,
freedom of speech is self-governance. Consequently, the First Amend-
ment must be viewed within the context of the democratic system in
which it functions, "which is not a marketplace free-for-all, but a self-
governing society with a community of purpose. '135
Meiklejohn's views regarding the First Amendment's focus on political
speech have been adopted by other free speech scholars. 136 Although
"the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of politi-
cal speech," it has never ruled that to qualify for high levels of constitu-
tional protection the speech at issue must relate to self-government. 137
However, in Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court did state, for example, that
132. Id. at 94.
133. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 130, at 30.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 32. Meiklejohn declared that the First Amendment applies only to speech
that bears, "directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal-only, there-
fore, to the consideration of matters of public interest." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 79.
According to Meiklejohn, the First Amendment "is not the guardian of unregulated talk-
ativeness .... What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said." Id. at 26.
136. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975) (declar-
ing that "the First Amendment should protect and indeed encourage speech so long as it
serves to make the political process work"); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV.
299, 358 (1978) (contending that "the sole legitimate First Amendment principle protects
only speech that participates in the process of representative democracy"); Harry Kalven,
Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment,
1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 208 (arguing that the First Amendment "has a central meaning-a
core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function").
137. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 130, at 33; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conserva-
tive Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) ("There can be no doubt that the
expenditures at issue in this case [expenditures by independent political committees sup-
porting reelection of President Reagan] produce speech at the core of the First Amend-
ment."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression ...."); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("To permit the continued building of our politics ...."); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[Tlhe essence of self-government .... "
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964))); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966) ("[A] major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The pro-
tection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."). In Connick v.
Myers, an action brought by an ex-government employee who claimed she was fired in
retaliation for criticisms she made about her employer, the Court focused on whether the
speech was political in character and whether it addressed "a matter of public concern."
461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). The Court examined whether the subject matter of the speech
was one upon which "free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate." Id. at 145 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968)).
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"speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government. '138 This opinion was repeated in FCC v.
League of Women Voters, where the Court stated that "editorial opinion
on matters of public importance ... is entitled to the most exacting de-
gree of First Amendment protection," 139 and that the "Framers of the
Bill of Rights were most anxious to protect-speech that is 'indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth.'"140 However, just when
the Court seems about to clarify the First Amendment hierarchy and the
place of political speech within that hierarchy, it backs away and refuses
to make any such distinctions. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, for instance, the Court even sug-
gested that commercial speech might be more important than political
speech: a "consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most
urgent political debate.' 41 Then when the Court recognized that some
commercial speech lacked any public interest or importance whatsoever,
it refused to distinguish between those types of speech and other speech
that did possess a degree of public interest. 142
As difficult a task as it is, the job of clarifying the parameters and char-
acteristics of the kind of speech protected by the First Amendment is a
job that needs to be done, especially as the amount of "speech" in our
media society increases exponentially. Meiklejohn knew it was not easy
to find a definition for political speech, but the mere difficulty of the task
is no reason to abandon it.14 3
The Court stated that if the speech was not of public concern, there was no First Amend-
ment protection against dismissal. Id. at 146.
138. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
139. 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984).
140. Id. at 383.
141. 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (emphasis added).
142. STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 53
(1990); see also Va. State Bd. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65 (stating that "no line between
publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could
ever be drawn"). The Supreme Court has also backed away from an approach it used in
Connick v. Myers, where it held that a public employee could be discharged for speech that
did not relate to matters of public concern-or, in other words, that the First Amendment
only protected speech that related to "matters of public concern." 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
This public concern test essentially adopts a "defining in" approach to First Amendment
doctrine. See supra note 85. But the Court has not built upon the "public concerns" ap-
proach used in Connick. It has not rested constitutional protection upon a definition of
public discourse that distinguishes "speech about 'matters of public concern' from speech
about 'matters of purely private concern."' See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept
of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 667 (1990). If it had done so, it may well have seen that
the "speech" of video games is not the kind of speech that makes up the public discourse.
It is not something that becomes part of a wider conversation, but simply an entertainment
that begins and ends with the user.
143. As Professor Sunstein notes, "there is no way to operate a system of free expres-
sion without drawing lines. Not everything that counts as words or pictures is entitled to
full constitutional protection. The question is not whether to draw lines, but how to draw
the right ones." Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 308 (1992).
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The American constitutional scheme, within which the First Amend-
ment is a part, is concerned not with individual freedom but with the
effective working of a democratic system of government (though respect-
ing the individual's ability to participate in that system).1 44 Judge Robert
Bork once went so far as to argue that the First Amendment should be
limited to protecting only explicitly political speech.145 He wrote that
freedom for literature, for instance, would depend not on constitutional
mandates, but upon the "enlightenment of society and its elected repre-
sentatives. ' 146 This is not as harsh a view as it might first seem. First of
all, for most authors, the abolition of the First Amendment would have
no practical effect on the dissemination of their work. Second, even if a
book was taken out of a library in one community, it would probably be
available in the next community down the road, and certainly available
for purchase through mail-order or the Internet. Third, even if a book
were banned because it had no First Amendment protection, there would
be full constitutional protection for any protest that arose over that deci-
sion. In other words, while the book itself might not constitute political
speech covered by the First Amendment, any protest over a book-ban-
ning law would certainly be protected speech.1 47 The advantage of the
Bork approach is that it gives communities the flexibility to deal with
troublesome media like violent video games.
148
Due to the flood of media technologies in search of entertainment con-
tent, and because of the fact that traditional political speech can be
crowded-out by this entertainment and marketing, the courts need to give
a stronger voice and identity to the First Amendment. This identity can
only come from more clearly defining the types of speech that warrant
constitutional protection. Perhaps, in light of how courts are dealing with
new media forms like video games, it is time to revisit Alexander
Meiklejohn's theories on the First Amendment and the type of speech it
protects.
144. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
145. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 20 (1971).
146. Id. at 28.
147. Professor Sunstein makes a similar argument. He argues that "[r]estrictions on
political speech have the distinctive feature of impairing the ordinary channels for political
change." Sunstein, supra note 143, at 306. As long as there is freedom of political speech,
controls on other kinds of speech can always be protested. For instance, "[i]f the govern-
ment bans violent pornography, citizens can continue to argue against the ban. But if the
government forecloses political argument, the democratic corrective is unavailable. Con-
trols on nonpolitical speech do not have this uniquely damaging feature." Id.
148. The everything-is-protected message of First Amendment jurisprudence has
helped to dull society's duty to make judgments about the state of civilized discourse in the
public arena. According to Judge Bork, "[o]ne of the freedoms, the major freedom, of our
kind of society is the freedom to choose to have a public morality." ROBERT BORK, TRA-
DITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1984). He decries the entry into First
Amendment law of what he describes as the "old, and incorrect, view that the only kinds of
harm that a community is entitled to suppress are physical and economic injuries .... The
result of discounting moral harm is the privatization of morality, which requires the law of
the community to practice moral relativism." Id. at 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the media component of American society grows, more "content" is
needed to fill all the digitized television channels, Internet sites, DVD
display racks, and video game store shelves. The explosive increase in all
this media content poses a new problem for the First Amendment. It
poses a crowding-out problem: a situation where media content that has
little value for a democratic society crowds out the kind of political and
public interest speech that, according to Alexander Meiklejohn, the First
Amendment is intended to protect. 149
For the past century, since Abrams v. United States,150 judges have been
concerned, in a First Amendment context, with freeing the marketplace
of ideas from any censoring impulses of government. However, as the
twenty-first century gets underway, a completely different concern should
be occupying the courts' First Amendment attentions. This concern still
involves censorship, but a censorship of a much different type. Now, the
real censorship danger to political speech is an indirect censorship-a
censorship caused by the flood of entertainment and advertising that
threatens to choke out political speech. 151 The courts contribute to this
indirect censorship if they fail to closely scrutinize any new forms of me-
dia content that make a claim for speech protection under the First
Amendment.
The video game cases reveal that courts tend to adopt a presumption of
constitutional protection to new forms of media content. Yet there is
nothing in First Amendment jurisprudence that commands the judiciary
to make this presumption. Strict scrutiny applies only after a particular
form of expression is deemed to constitute speech. Before all the First
Amendment protections come into play, the courts must ensure that the
First Amendment actually covers the particular media or content at issue.
Next, even after that particular media or content is determined to warrant
First Amendment coverage, the courts should then place it within the
First Amendment hierarchy; and in doing so, the courts should also con-
sider whether the content or media at hand is sufficiently "low-value" to
receive the kind of treatment given to fighting words and defamation and
149. Professor Sunstein agrees with Meiklejohn that "the First Amendment is princi-
pally about political deliberation." Sunstein, supra note 143, at 301. Moreover, Sunstein
claims that "every Justice has expressed some such view within the last generation." Id.
He argues that a "conception of free speech that centers on democratic governance ap-
pears to be the best way to organize our considered judgments about cases likely to raise
hard First Amendment questions." Id. at 307. Sunstein also takes Meiklejohn's theory one
step further, by offering his own definition of political speech: "I will treat speech as politi-
cal when it is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue." Id. at 304. Using this definition, video games would not qualify as political
speech because they are not being received as contributions to public deliberation, regard-
less of whether they are intended as such.
150. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
151. Some observers have noted how many types of media content in contemporary
society amount more to a type of commodity or commercial product or action than a form
of speech or communication of ideas or information. See PATRICK M. GARRY, AN AMERI-
CAN PARADOX: CENSORSHIP IN A NATION OF SPEECH (1993).
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obscenity. In their evaluation of new media intent, the courts are not
confined to the existing "low-value" categories. There is nothing prevent-
ing courts from creating new categories as technological developments
warrant. In this sense, the question can be asked, in connection with the
degree of positive value associated with each kind of content, whether
there is any real difference between obscenity and violent video games?
Should they both fail to warrant constitutional protection? Do they not
rise to the kind of speech the First Amendment means to cover, even if
their failure occurs in different ways? Do either one of them contribute
anything of real, lasting value to a democracy dependent on the healthy
development of its youth?
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